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“SPECIAL” DELIVERY: WHERE DO NATIONAL
SECURITY LETTERS FIT INTO THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT?
Lauren M. Weiner ∗

INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2005, agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(“FBI”) visited George Christian, a digital services manager for over threedozen Connecticut libraries 1 and presented him with a “National Security
Letter.” 2 The letter directed Mr. Christian to turn over subscriber
information and access logs of Internet users at a certain library. 3 Over
30,000 National Security Letters, or “NSLs,” are issued each year,
presumably to investigate terrorists. 4 But because NSLs require the
recipient to keep the letter secret,5 what do we really know about NSLs?
Historically, if an investigation concerned “international terrorist
activities” it was subject to little oversight. 6 Serious abuses of investigative
power, however, led Congress to enact legislation designed to protect civil
liberties, even for “foreign intelligence investigations.” 7 After the terrorist
∗
J.D. candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2007; B.S., Northwestern
University, 2000. I would like to thank Professor Dan Richman for his guidance, Genevive
Blake for her careful edits and Nick Mitchell for thoughtfully reviewing countless drafts and
helping me clarify my position on this issue.
1. Barton Gellman, The FBI’s Secret Scrutiny: In Hunt for Terrorists, Bureau
Examines Records of Ordinary Americans, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 2005, at A1. Under the
newest changes to the USA PATRIOT Act, most libraries are now exempt from complying
with NSLs. See David Stout, Bush Signs Bill Renewing Patriot Act, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9,
2006 (online edition, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/09/politics/09cndpatriot.html).
2. Gellman, supra note 1, at A1.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See 18 U.S.C. § 2709(c) (2006).
6. Michael J. Woods, Counterintelligence and Access to Transactional Records: A
Practical History of USA PATRIOT Act Section 215, 1 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 37,
39-40 (2005).
7. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-11, 1821-29,
1841-46, 1861-62, 1871 (2006).
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attacks of September 11, 2001 (“9/11”), Congress passed the USA
PATRIOT Act (“PATRIOT Act”) 8 to aid law enforcement efforts to fight
The PATRIOT Act broadened the scope of certain
terrorism. 9
investigatory tools, making the job of law enforcement easier and
subjecting law enforcement agencies to fewer limitations. One such tool,
National Security Letters, gives the government the authority to request
certain types of transactional records without requiring judicial preapproval and without giving the recipient a meaningful method to
challenge it.10 This begs the question: what does it mean to “fight
terrorism?” Is the goal to prevent further terrorist attacks or to prosecute
the perpetrators? That question has some important implications as the
government struggles to sculpt a regulatory regime for terrorism cases that
will be both effective and constitutional. There are different rules and
procedures for domestic criminal investigations than for investigations that
focus on foreign intelligence gathering. It is clear that a murder
investigation is intended to gather evidence that will lead to the prosecution
of the killer. When it comes to counter-terrorism, however, it is not as easy
to determine whether the investigation is for the purpose of deterrence or
prosecution. Furthermore, what safeguard is there to prevent a law
enforcement officer, even one with good intentions, from using the less
stringent standards for foreign intelligence operations to gather evidence
that wouldn’t otherwise be accessible if he had to follow the stricter
procedures for a domestic criminal investigation?
In several of its sections, the PATRIOT Act combines the procedures for
traditional criminal law enforcement with the looser procedural standards
that are in place for foreign counterintelligence investigations. 11 In some
respects, NSLs are similar to administrative subpoenas—an informationgathering tool for domestic criminal investigations. In fact, the Bush
Administration has suggested granting the FBI administrative subpoena
power for counter-terrorism investigations so they would have the same
tools available to catch terrorists as are already available to catch doctors

8. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 18, 22, 31, 42, 49 and 50
U.S.C. (2006)).
9. Neil A. Lewis & Robert Pear, A Nation Challenged: Congress; Negotiators Back
Scaled-Down Bill to Battle Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2001, at A1.
10. Woods, supra note 6, at 41. NSLs were not created by the PATRIOT Act, but it
expanded the government’s power to use them. See infra notes 14-18 and accompanying
text.
11. See infra notes 73-96 and accompanying text for a discussion of foreign intelligence
investigations.

WEINER_CHRISTENSEN

2006]

2/3/2011 10:21 PM

“SPECIAL” DELIVERY

103

engaged in insurance fraud. 12 This suggestion, however, over-simplifies
the issue and disregards the fundamental differences between foreign
intelligence investigations and criminal investigations—especially as
related to the constitutionality of warrantless searches.
So what are NSLs? Are they ordinary domestic law enforcement tools
that have the looser standards of foreign intelligence-gathering tools? Or
are they tools for foreign intelligence that may be used for ordinary
domestic criminal investigations? Are they constitutional? And even if
constitutional, are they still problematic?
This Comment will examine NSLs both in the context of foreign
intelligence and domestic criminal investigations. There are substantial
arguments on both sides of the debate over the constitutionality of NSLs;
this Comment will primarily be focused on how to classify NSLs and how
to use them in a manner that reduces the potential for abuse or overreaching. This Comment will argue that NSLs are not foreign intelligence
tools, but are merely foreign intelligence exceptions to domestic laws that
allow law enforcement access to records that would otherwise be protected
by privacy laws. Accordingly, NSLs must be able to satisfy the
constitutional requirements for domestic searches. First, this Comment will
provide background on NSLs, the Fourth Amendment, and the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act. Then, this Comment will examine NSLs in
the context of the permissible exceptions to the warrant requirement for
searches—specifically the “special needs” exception.
Finally, this
Comment will argue that even if NSLs are constitutional despite their
issuance without a warrant, they still have great potential for abuse and
additional safeguards beyond the recent revisions are necessary.
PART I: BACKGROUND
In evaluating laws pertaining to criminal procedure, one must make a
distinction between investigations focused on “foreign agents,” or general
foreign intelligence, and ordinary domestic criminal investigations.13 Law
enforcement officials are authorized to use a more expansive set of tools to
obtain records and information when the investigation pertains to foreign
persons or intelligence activities. This section will first examine the
statutes authorizing NSLs, and will outline their powers and their
12. See President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President in a Conversation on the
U.S.A.
Patriot
Act
(April
20,
2004),
available
at
http://www.votesmart.org/speech_detail.php?speech_id=33849 (last visited February 25, 2006); see also
David E. Sanger, Two Years Later: The President; President Urging Wider U.S. Powers in
Terrorism Law, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2003, at A1.
13. See infra notes 73-96 and accompanying text.
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limitations. This section will also discuss the Fourth Amendment and its
relationship to domestic and foreign investigations because, in some
respects, NSLs are a hybrid of foreign and domestic investigatory
standards.
A. National Security Letters
Law enforcement officials are authorized to issue NSLs under three
statutes: the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (“ECPA”),14
the Right to Financial Privacy Act, 15 and the Fair Credit Reporting Act.16
These statutes were enacted to offer protection to individuals for records in
the possession of third parties, an area not covered by the Fourth
Amendment. 17 NSLs were included as an exception to this protection by
allowing access to these records for government agencies “authorized to
conduct foreign counter- or foreign positive-intelligence activities.”18
This Note will primarily focus on the ECPA—the statute that has most
frequently been evaluated in the context of national security. 19 The ECPA
was designed to give statutory protection to stored electronic information
held by a “wire or electronic communications service provider.” 20
Section 2709, the national security provision of Title II of the ECPA,
was designed to enable law enforcement to investigate suspected terrorists
or foreign agents. 21 The original version of the ECPA section 2709
allowed the FBI to compel production of (1) subscriber information
(limited to name, address, and length of service); (2) local and long
14. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C.).
15. 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5)(A) (Supp. 2004).
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681u, 1681v (Supp. 2004). Another statute, 50 U.S.C. § 436(b)
(2006), authorizes the government to compel disclosure of certain records of current or
former government employees who at one time had access to classified information.
17. Woods, supra note 6, at 46-49. The Supreme Court’s holding in United States v.
Miller permitted the government to access financial records from a bank without violating
the Fourth Amendment. See 425 U.S. 435, 444 (1976).
18. Woods, supra note 6, at 43.
19. Much of the uproar over NSLs centered on their use to obtain library records. For a
detailed discussion see generally Susan Nevelow Mart, Protecting the Lady from Toledo:
Post-USA PATRIOT Act Electronic Surveillance at the Library, 96 L. LIBR. J. 449 (2004).
Librarians and others raised concerns that library patrons may believe that the FBI is
looking into the books they read and the websites they visit on library computers. Id. at 468.
20. Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 201, 100 Stat. 1848, 1867 (2006) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 2709). Title I of the statute defines an electronic communications service (“ECS”)
as “any service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or
electronic communications.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2002).
21. Title II is also referred to as the “Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and
Transactional Records Act.” See Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 201.
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distance toll billing records; and (3) electronic communication transactional
records. 22
The standard for obtaining this information under the original version of
the ECPA was that the information sought had to be “relevant to an
authorized foreign counterintelligence investigation,” and there had to be
“specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that the person or
entity to whom the information sought pertain[ed] [was] a foreign power or
agent of a foreign power.” 23 There are other provisions of Title II of the
ECPA that allow law enforcement to obtain similar types of information in
the context of a “criminal investigation,” but, unlike NSLs, those
provisions require judicial pre-approval. 24 The fact that the ECPA provides
access to records in domestic criminal investigations may be a significant
factor in evaluating whether NSLs under section 2709 serve a purpose
beyond the need for ordinary law enforcement.25
Further, while domestic criminal investigations require the approval of a
judge, NSLs for national security investigations are authorized by the
agency that issues them. 26 Before passage of the PATRIOT Act, an NSL
required only the approval of an FBI official with a rank “not lower than
Deputy Assistant Director.” 27 The issues of self-authorization and rank of
law enforcement officials authorized to approve NSLs will be revisited in
later sections of this Note, as part of a discussion of the potential for
overreaching on the part of the law enforcement agencies. 28
Section 2709 remained relatively unchanged 29 until the USA PATRIOT

22. Memorandum from General Counsel, Fed. Bureau of Investigation to All Field
Offices 2 (Nov. 28, 2001) [hereinafter FBI NSL Memo]; see also H.R. REP. NO. 103-46, at 6
(1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1913, 1917. “Transactional records” generally refer
to records of the communication that do not reveal their content. For example, a
transactional record would reveal the phone numbers dialed from a particular phone, but
would not reveal the substance of the calls. See FBI NSL Memo, supra, at 4-5.
23. 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (1996).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2006) (requiring a warrant); 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(B)(i)
(requiring a subpoena); 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (requiring a court order).
25. See infra notes 125-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of the “special
needs” exception to the Fourth Amendment.
26. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2709(b)(1)-(2).
27. Id. Other sections of Title II require the FBI to obtain a warrant or a subpoena, but
these sections pertain to “criminal investigation[s],” not foreign intelligence. See 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2703 (a), (b)(1)(B)(i), (d). See also infra notes 97-118 and accompanying text for a
further discussion of domestic criminal investigations.
28. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
29. In 1993, following the first World Trade Center bombings, the “foreign power”
requirement was loosened to allow investigation of an individual who communicated with a
foreign power regarding terrorism or foreign intelligence. 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (1994); H.R.
REP. NO. 103-46, at 3 (1993).
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Act enlarged NSL power specifically, and foreign intelligence-gathering
power more generally. Passed seven weeks after 9/11, the draft bill of the
USA PATRIOT Act 30 called for, in pertinent part, expansion of the
government’s information-gathering powers by eliminating or reducing
judicial oversight.31 A period of intense negotiations between the
legislative and executive branches followed.32 The proposal by Senator
Patrick Leahy would have allowed increased intelligence powers, but
would have included significantly more judicial supervision than the
administration’s plan. 33 The Bush administration made it clear that its
priority was to get new anti-terrorism legislation through Congress as
quickly as possible. 34 While congressional democrats, like Senator Leahy,
indicated that Congress would not be pushed to act in haste and that they
would continue to work to balance law enforcement needs with
constitutional rights,35 many of the negotiations were done behind closed
doors in private meetings. Senator Russ Feingold stated “there has not
been an open process in the Judiciary Committee, much less the full
Senate, for Senators to have an opportunity to raise concerns about how far
this bill goes in giving power to law enforcement to . . . investigate lawabiding U.S. citizens.” 36 Regardless of such concerns, the PATRIOT Act
was passed and on October 26, 2001, it was signed into law. 37
The PATRIOT Act changed NSLs by expanding the FBI’s power to use
them and by codifying and correcting disparities in pre-existing law
30. See generally Consultation and Discussion Draft Bill to Combat Terrorism and
Defend the Nation Against Terrorist Acts, and for Other Purposes, with the short title,
“Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001” (administration draft bill, Sept. 19, 2001), available at
www.epic.org/privacy/terrorism/ata2001_text.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2006); see also
Beryl A. Howell, Seven Weeks: the Making of the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1145, 1153 n.43 (2004). The administration’s draft bill was renamed because the
initials “ATA” were too close to the name of one of the 9/11 hijackers, Mohamed Atta.
Howell, supra, at 1153 n.43.
31. Howell, supra note 30, at 1146-54.
32. Id. at 1154.
33. See generally Draft, Uniting and Strengthening America Act (Senator Leahy’s draft
bill), available at http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200109/AYO01_714.pdf (last visited Oct.
20, 2006). Leahy’s plan, for example, allowed the information from a grand jury
investigation to be shared, but required court authorization and a certification that the
matters were relevant to a terrorism investigation. Id. at 130-31.
34. See Howell, supra note 30, at 1160-62 (discussing the administration’s comments
regarding the passage of the legislation).
35. See 147 CONG. REC. S10, 547 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2001).
36. 147 CONG. REC. S10, 36301 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2001).
37. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). While certain provisions of the
PATRIOT Act were originally scheduled to “sunset” on December 31, 2005, negotiations
continued past the deadline and the reauthorization of the Act was signed into law on March
9, 2006. See Stout, supra note 1.
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relating to Internet and telephone records gathering. 38 NSLs were
broadened by (1) expanding the scope of applicable investigations from
“authorized foreign counterintelligence operation[s]” to “authorized
investigation[s] to protect against international terrorism or clandestine
intelligence activities”; (2) compelling production where the information
sought is merely “relevant” to the investigation; (3) substituting relevance
for “specific and articulable facts”; and (4) lowering the rank of the FBI
official who can authorize an NSL from “Deputy Assistant Director,” to
“Special Agent in Charge” of a field office. 39
B. The Fourth Amendment
Much of the debate surrounding law enforcement power involves the
Fourth Amendment and whether or not certain law enforcement tools are
violative of the rights it guarantees. The Fourth Amendment provides that
the
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized. 40

In order for the Fourth Amendment to effectively regulate the investigatory
process, it needs to have a “meaningful enforcement mechanism” and must
be broadly applicable.41
The Fourth Amendment will protect individuals from the abuse of law
enforcement power if the contested activity is classifiable as a “search” or a
“seizure.” 42 The Supreme Court has held that a seizure is a “meaningful

38. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 209, 115 Stat. at 283 (correcting the disparate
requirements to allow access to stored e-mail and voicemail).
39. See 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (2006). There are only a limited number of Deputy Assistant
Directors, located at FBI headquarters and in the New York and Los Angeles field offices.
There are fifty-six FBI field offices in the United States and each of those, with the
exception of the New York and Los Angeles offices, have one Special Agent in Charge
(“SAC”). The New York and Los Angeles offices have SACs for special projects or
divisions. The head of the New York and Los Angeles field offices are Assistant Directors.
See Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Your Local FBI Office Field Divisions,
http://www.fbi.gov/contact/fo/fo.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2006).
40. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
41. Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr’s Misguided
Call for Judicial Deference, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 749-50 (2005). Applicability refers
to the specific law enforcement activities that are covered by the Fourth Amendment. Id.
42. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 2.1 (4th ed. 2004) (citing Anthony Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment,
58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 356 (1974)) [hereinafter LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE]; see also
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interference with an individual’s possessory interests” in property. 43 The
definition of a search is less clear and has been frequently reevaluated. 44
Taken as a whole, it seems that searches are physical intrusions into “a
constitutionally protected area.”45 If the intrusion is classified as either a
search or seizure, it must be “reasonable.” 46
One way for law enforcement to conduct a “reasonable” search is to
obtain a warrant. 47 The Supreme Court has expressed its preference for
searches made with judicial pre-approval, rather than having search and
seizure decisions made on the scene by police officers. 48 In order for a
warrant to be granted, there must be a showing of “probable cause.” 49
Probable cause requires law enforcement officers to have sufficient
evidence to convince a neutral magistrate that the search is likely to reveal
criminal activity. 50 Search warrants may not be used in cases of mere
suspicion, because they require a showing of facts to support probable
cause. 51
A search where the law enforcement officer has first obtained a warrant
is presumptively reasonable, but there are circumstances in which the
Fourth Amendment permits searches without one. 52 Generally speaking,
an activity covered by the Fourth Amendment (i.e. a search or seizure)
must be reasonable; if it is not covered then there are no limitations on law

Solove, supra note 41, at 750.
43. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 42, § 2.1(a) (citations omitted).
44. Id.
45. Id. (citing Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961)).
46. See Solove, supra note 41, at 750.
47. For a detailed discussion of the history of the warrant clause see Harold J. Krent,
The Continuity Principle, Administrative Constraint, and the Fourth Amendment, 81 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 53, 57-61 (2005).
48. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 42, § 4.1 (citations omitted). See infra
note 152 for a discussion of potential abuse of power when decisions are in the hands of
low-level officers.
49. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The probable cause requirement was included in the Fourth
Amendment to protect individuals from indiscriminate government searches and seizures.
See generally Ronald M. Gould & Simon Stern, Catastrophic Threats and the Fourth
Amendment, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 786 (2004). The Framers of the Constitution included
the probable cause requirement as part of the Bill of Rights in reaction to the arbitrary
abuses of police power suffered under British rule, especially warrants that did not
specifically name an individual suspect. Id. at 790.
50. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
51. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (requiring law enforcement officers requesting a search
warrant to “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized”).
52. Solove, supra note 41, at 751-53 (discussing the retreat of Fourth Amendment
protections). For a discussion of warrantless searches see infra notes 71-72 and
accompanying text.
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enforcement’s power under the Fourth Amendment. 53
While much Fourth Amendment jurisprudence regarding the
applicability of the Fourth Amendment relies upon Justice Harlan’s
concurrence in Katz v. United States, 54 there has been much debate and
dissension over the definition of “privacy.” 55 According to Justice Harlan,
the Fourth Amendment is applicable if the individual has an “actual”
(subjective) expectation of privacy, and that expectation is “one that society
is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” 56 Prior to the Court’s holding in
Katz, an intrusion into an individual’s privacy required an actual physical
invasion of an individual’s home or person.57 While the holding in Katz
effectively rejected this conception of privacy, 58 there are other views of
privacy that are equally, if not more, limiting to the scope of Fourth
Amendment protection. Professor Daniel Solove refers to one such
conception as the “secrecy paradigm”—that the only invasion of privacy
occurs when a “deep secret is uncovered.” 59 According to this view,
records, such as the transactional records accessible by issuing an NSL,
would not be considered “secret” enough to be private and thus would not
be covered by the Fourth Amendment. 60
An additional limitation on the Fourth Amendment’s applicability
pertaining to NSLs is the “third party doctrine.” The third party doctrine
provides that information placed in the hands of, or that is known to, a third
party, no longer falls under a reasonable expectation of privacy.61
Examples include bank records 62 and records of the phone numbers that a
person dials. 63 The third party doctrine conceivably applies to the records
accessible by an NSL; subscriber information and toll records are in the
53. Solove, supra note 41, at 750.
54. 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
55. Solove, supra note 41, at 751.
56. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (internal quotations omitted).
57. See generally Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (holding that an
individual was not protected from government wiretapping because the government did not
physically enter his home).
58. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (holding that the Fourth Amendment “protects people, not
places”).
59. See Solove, supra note 41, at 751 (citing DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON:
TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 42 (2004)).
60. Id. at 752-53.
61. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment
does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him
to Government authorities.”).
62. Id. at 441-43.
63. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). In Smith, the Court held that because
people are aware that the numbers they dial go to the phone company, they do not “harbor
any general expectation that the numbers they dial will remain secret.” Id. at 743.
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possession of the phone company or Internet service provider (“ISP”).
While the primary remedy for a violation of the Fourth Amendment is
the exclusionary rule, 64 searches made pursuant to a warrant may be
challenged only after they are executed.65 It may be difficult to suppress
evidence gathered from a search executed pursuant to a warrant, however,
as the courts tend to find that the search warrant was presumptively valid if
signed by a neutral magistrate.66
In the context of NSLs, it is important to note that third parties, such as a
telephone company, lack standing to challenge the validity of a search,
even if it affects the third party’s privacy interests.67 A third party has its
own Fourth Amendment right to freedom from unreasonable search and
seizure; it cannot be required to turn over records absent consent or a
Fourth Amendment sanctioned procedure. 68 For example, a subscriber to
an Internet service would not be able to challenge a search of the records of
the ISP; the provider would be the only party with the ability to challenge
that search. Further, using search warrants as a means of obtaining
information from a third party may be unnecessarily intrusive where the
third party is willing to surrender the documents without compelling their
production. 69
Despite the preference for searches pursuant to a warrant from a
constitutional perspective, there are arguments to be made against a warrant
requirement. The process of obtaining a warrant requires a considerable
expenditure of time—on the part of the judges who must examine the facts
and the officers who must demonstrate the existence of probable cause with
a showing of particular facts. 70 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has
64. The exclusionary rule allows the suppression of evidence obtained through a search
that infringes upon an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights. See United States v. Caladra,
414 U.S. 338 (1974); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
65. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 42, § 4.1(f).
66. Id. § 11.2(b).
67. Id. § 11.3(d) (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 passim (1976) (holding
bank customer could not challenge seizure of records from the bank)).
68. E.g., Seattle Times News Servs., Phone Records: Telecoms May Be in Trouble,
SEATTLE TIMES, May 13, 2006, at A1.
69. See Graham Hughes, Administrative Subpoenas and the Grand Jury: Converging
Streams of Criminal and Civil Compulsory Process, 47 VAND. L. REV. 573, 575 (1994).
Search warrants offer Fourth Amendment protections that may not be necessary when
dealing with third parties, such as telephone carriers, who might be willing to turn over the
requested information on demand. See generally United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435
(1976). Department of Justice policy advises that warrants should not be used in an
investigation if the information sought can be obtained through less intrusive means. 28
C.F.R. § 59.1 (2005); see also FBI NSL Memo, supra note 22, at 3.
70. See Krent, supra note 47, at 62 (“The Framers’ decision to require ex ante review in
each case reflects their commitment not to relegate protection for privacy to after-the-fact
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enumerated two tests applied by courts to determine when a warrantless
search will overcome the presumption of unreasonableness. The “specialneeds” exception allows warrantless searches where the primary purpose in
administering the search goes beyond the ordinary need for law
enforcement and the state’s interest in that purpose outweighs the
individual’s privacy interest. 71 The other test, called the “reasonableness
balancing test,” permits warrantless searches where the totality of the
state’s legitimate interests outweigh the privacy interests of the individual
to be searched. 72 Both tests are potentially applicable to NSLs, which, after
all, are searches performed without judicial review.
1. Foreign Intelligence Investigations
This section, along with a discussion of information-gathering for
domestic investigations, 73 will provide context in which to determine
whether NSLs fall within the realm of foreign intelligence—and
accordingly should be placed under the auspices of the specialized court
that handles foreign intelligence matters—or if they are actually tools for
ordinary domestic law enforcement. Although discussion of foreign
intelligence law centers on the regulations for surveillance and wiretaps, it
is applicable to NSLs both because foreign intelligence law now includes
access to “tangible objects,” and because the standards set forth under
foreign intelligence law are similar to those in section 2709 of the ECPA. 74
Intelligence-gathering for domestic criminal investigations clearly falls
under the auspices of the Fourth Amendment. 75 Nevertheless, the question
of how to regulate national security intelligence remained open for many
years. In 1972, the Supreme Court, in United States v. U.S. Dist. Court,
commonly known as the “Keith” case, found that the restrictions placed on
wiretaps for domestic investigations did not limit “the constitutional power
of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the
United States against the overthrow of the Government by force or other
unlawful means.” 76 The Court further held that “security surveillance may
mechanisms . . . .”).
71. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
72. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001); see also Wyoming v.
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).
73. See infra notes 97-118 and accompanying text.
74. See supra note 26.
75. See Solove, supra note 41, at 754-56. Wiretapping is covered by the Fourth
Amendment, but is regulated through the Wiretap Act. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 25102520 (2000).
76. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 307-08 (1972).
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involve different policy and practical considerations from the surveillance
of ordinary crime.” 77 The Court declined, however, to rule on the
executive’s power to use surveillance “with respect to the activities of
foreign powers, within or without this country.” 78 The decision in Keith
indicated that the Supreme Court accepted the possibility that “[d]ifferent
standards,” other than a traditional warrant, “may be compatible with the
Fourth Amendment if [it is] reasonable both in relation to the legitimate
need of Government for intelligence information and the protected rights of
our citizens.” 79
Six years after the decision in Keith, Congress addressed the questions
left unanswered by its holding. 80 The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (“FISA”) of 1978 81 was enacted by Congress to create a regulatory
regime outside of the traditional regime for criminal law, which would act
as a check on the executive’s power to conduct investigations of “foreign
agents” in the United States. 82 Under FISA, the government must apply for
orders from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”) in order
to conduct intelligence-gathering activities.83 The FISC is designed to hear
requests for court orders that pertain to foreign intelligence.84
Pre-PATRIOT Act, FISA orders were primarily used for electronic
surveillance of foreign agents. 85 Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act

77. Id. at 322 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
78. Id. at 307-08. The Keith Court also addressed the question of the Fourth
Amendment implications of national security surveillance without the prior approval of a
neutral magistrate, as would be required to obtain a Title III wiretap order. See Peter P.
Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1306,
1315 (2004) (citing Keith, 407 U.S. at 309 (citations omitted)).
79. Keith, 407 U.S. at 322.
80. See Richard Henry Seamon & William Dylan Gardner, The Patriot Act and the Wall
Between Foreign Intelligence and Law Enforcement, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 319, 321
(2005); Solove, supra note 41, at 756.
81. Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-11, 182129, 1841-46, 1861-62, 1871).
82. Swire, supra note 78, at 1313.
83. See 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (2006). For surveillance activities involving communications
“exclusively between or among foreign powers” with “no substantial likelihood that the
surveillance will acquire the contents of any communication to which a United States person
is a party,” the government may conduct the surveillance without a court order. See 50
U.S.C. § 1802 (a)(1).
84. See 50 U.S.C. § 1803. The FISC currently consists of eleven district court judges
appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Id. Originally, the FISC had seven
judges, but the PATRIOT Act added additional judges. See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L.
No. 107-56, § 208(i), 115 Stat. 272, 283 (2001).
85. Following the bombings in Oklahoma City and the World Trade Center, Congress
authorized FISA orders for travel records. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1862 (2006) (allowing
access to records held by common carriers (airlines, trains, etc.), physical storage facilities
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amended FISA, however, by allowing its use to compel production of
business records and other “tangible objects.” 86 The scope of materials
covered by section 215 now includes books, records, papers, documents,
and “other items,” provided that the government can make the requisite
showing to the FISC. 87
Prior to the passage of the PATRIOT Act, the showing required for a
FISA order was probable cause that the target of the request was a “foreign
power or an agent of a foreign power” and that the “purpose” of the
investigation was to gather foreign intelligence.88 Now, FISA’s scope has
been expanded to include investigations where foreign intelligence
gathering is a “significant purpose.” 89 The PATRIOT Act also lowered the
burden of proof for the government to obtain an order for business records
or for other “tangible things.” 90 Previously, a FISA order required a
showing of “specific and articulable facts” giving “reason to believe that
the person to whom the records pertain[ed] [was] a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power.” 91 Now, when applying for a FISA order, the
application need only “specify that the records concerned are sought for an
authorized investigation.” 92 The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has the
discretion to define the term “authorized investigation.” 93 Moreover, FISA
orders now can be used to investigate virtually anyone, as there is no
requirement that the request include a specific target.94 The investigation
must simply “protect against international terrorism or clandestine
intelligence activities” —a broad standard that could include many types of
The implications of this change are potentially
investigations. 95
enormous—it allows the government to use a FISA order to gather
information for an ordinary domestic prosecution if one of the purposes of
the investigation relates to foreign intelligence. 96

(rental lockers, etc.), public accommodation facilities (hotels, etc.), and vehicle rental
facilities).
86. See Swire, supra note 78, at 1331.
87. See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861(b)(2) (West 2003).
88. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3)(A) (2000).
89. Id. § 1804(a)(7)(B), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 204 (emphasis added); see
also Solove, supra note 41, at 757.
90. USA PATRIOT Act § 215.
91. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(B) (1998). Compare U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
92. 50 U.S.C.A § 1861(b)(2) (West 2006).
93. Swire, supra note 78, at 1331; see also FBI NSL Memo, supra note 22, at 2-3.
94. See Swire, supra note 78, at 1331.
95. 50 U.S.C.A. §1861(b)(2) (West 2006).
96. See, e.g., Solove, supra note 41, at 757.
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2. Domestic Law Enforcement
In a previous section, this Note established that NSLs were originally
intended as foreign intelligence exceptions to statutes that protect
privacy. 97 Given that NSLs are not subject to restraints placed on other
foreign intelligence investigations through FISA, 98 e.g., pre-approval by
the FISC, arguably, NSLs should then be subjected to either the
constitutional or statutory protections required for domestic criminal
investigations. This next section will briefly examine two types of
information-gathering
techniques
for
criminal
investigations:
administrative subpoenas and grand jury subpoenas. These tools do not
violate the Fourth Amendment, despite procedures that differ from ordinary
search warrants. Accordingly, they may serve as a valuable comparison
when deciding whether NSLs are constitutional under the Fourth
Amendment.
a. Administrative Subpoenas
Administrative subpoenas are issued by federal agencies pursuant to a
delegation of power from Congress. 99 An administrative subpoena can
compel documents and testimony. 100 Administrative subpoenas also
enable investigators to bypass the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause
requirement in criminal investigations.101 An administrative subpoena

97. See supra Part I.A and accompanying text.
98. See supra Part I.A and accompanying text.
99. See Katherine Scherb, Comment, Administrative Subpoenas for Private Financial
Records: What Protection for Privacy Does the Fourth Amendment Afford?, 1996 WIS. L.
REV. 1075, 1076-85 (providing a history of the development of administrative subpoena
power). Examples of agencies that issue administrative subpoenas include the Securities
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”). See 15
U.S.C. § 78u(b) (2002) (investigating violations of securities law); 26 U.S.C. § 7602(a)
(1998) (investigating tax code violations); see also Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPPA), 18 U.S.C. § 3486 (2000). The Attorney General was
granted the power to conduct criminal investigations into healthcare fraud using a civil
administrative subpoena. 18 U.S.C. § 3486.
100. See Risa Berkower, Note, Sliding Down a Slippery Slope? The Future Use of
Administrative Subpoenas in Criminal Investigations, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2251, 2257
(2005).
101. See Okla. Press Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946) (holding that
compliance with an administrative subpoena did not present a question of an actual search
or seizure and, accordingly, the Fourth Amendment was not directly applicable); see also
Berkower, supra note 100, at 2253 (citing Doe v. United States, 253 F.3d 256, 263 (6th Cir.
2001) (holding that no probable cause is required to issue an administrative subpoena under
18 U.S.C. § 3486)). Courts treat civil and criminal matters differently for Fourth
Amendment purposes; the Constitution is far more protective of a criminal defendant’s
rights. See Berkower, supra note 100 at 2261 (citing Ronald F. Wright, Note, The Civil and
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initiates an open proceeding with plenty of opportunity for a party opposing
the requested materials to challenge the subpoena in court. Furthermore,
the Supreme Court has indicated that administrative subpoenas are not
actual searches and as such, need not require a showing of probable
cause. 102 Generally, administrative subpoenas will be enforced by the
courts so long as: (1) the investigation has a legitimate purpose; (2) the
inquiry is related to that purpose; (3) the agency does not already have the
information sought; and (4) the agency follows proper procedures.103
Administrative subpoenas “commence[] an adversar[ial] process” that
permits judicial review of its reasonableness. 104
b. Grand Jury Subpoenas
The federal grand jury is an investigative body given broad power to
compel testimony and production of documents. 105 An investigative grand
jury has the authority, absent a showing of valid privilege, to subpoena any
books, papers, documents, data, or other objects, 106 and to compel witness
testimony. 107 A grand jury subpoena may be issued without a showing of
probable cause, 108 and the grand jury “can investigate merely on suspicion
that the law is being violated, or even just because it wants assurance that it
is not.” 109
One limitation on the grand jury subpoena power is Rule 17(c) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides that, “on motion
made promptly, the court may quash or modify the subpoena if compliance
would be unreasonable or oppressive.” 110 It is, however, exceedingly
difficult to quash a subpoena once it is issued. 111 The moving party must

Criminal Methodologies of the Fourth Amendment, 93 YALE L.J. 1127, 1127 (1984)).
102. See, e.g., Okla. Press Publ’g Co., 327 U.S. at 209.
103. See Doe v. United States, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing United
States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964)).
104. See United States v. Bailey, 228 F.3d 341, 348 (4th Cir. 2000) (“As judicial process
is afforded before any intrusion occurs, the proposed intrusion is regulated by, and its
justification derives from, that process.”).
105. See Sara Sun Beale & James E. Felman, The Consequences of Enlisting Federal
Grand Juries in the War on Terrorism: Assessing the USA PATRIOT Act’s Changes to
Grand Jury Secrecy, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 699, 700 (2002).
106. See id. at 701.
107. See id. A witness may refuse to speak to an investigator, but is not equally free to
refuse to testify before the grand jury. Id.
108. Id. at 701-02.
109. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-43 (1950).
110. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c); see also United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 29899 (1991) (internal citations omitted).
111. See generally R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292.
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show that the subpoena is “unreasonable or oppressive,” and that the
motion will fail if there is a “reasonable possibility that the category of
materials the Government seeks will produce information relevant to the
general subject of the grand jury’s investigation.” 112
An individual subpoenaed by a grand jury cannot directly challenge the
subpoena; the individual must refuse to comply and, if the government
initiates a contempt proceeding, can then assert that the subpoena is
unreasonably burdensome. 113 A target 114 of a grand jury investigation can
assert that the subpoenaed documents (or testimony) falls under a valid
constitutional, 115 statutory, 116 or common law 117 privilege, even if those
documents are in the possession of a third party. 118
PART II. NSLS AND DOMESTIC CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS
Thus far, this Note has discussed the statutory framework of NSLs and
then examined foreign intelligence and domestic criminal investigatory
regimes in order to classify NSLs as belonging to one or the other. Prior to
the passage of the PATRIOT Act and the loosening of the standards for
issuing an NSL, it was easier to categorize NSLs as foreign intelligence
tools. And as foreign intelligence tools, NSLs are not required to meet the
standards for criminal investigations. 119 Now that NSLs can be used for
investigations that have purposes besides foreign intelligence, perhaps
NSLs should be required to satisfy the requirements for domestic criminal
investigations. Because information regarding NSL use is classified, it is
difficult to know if they are in fact being used to investigate. The potential
for abuse alone, however, lends weight to the argument that NSLs must fit
within a Fourth Amendment sanctioned regulatory regime for domestic
criminal investigations.
112. Id. at 299-301 (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 700 (1974)).
113. See United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 532 (1971) (“If . . . the subpoena is unduly
burdensome or otherwise unlawful, [the recipient] may refuse to comply and litigate those
questions in the event that contempt or similar proceedings are brought against him.”).
114. Generally, there are three categories of individuals called before a grand jury:
targets, subjects, and witnesses. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL,
CRIMINAL DIVISION § 9-11.151 (2006).
115. U.S. CONST. amends. I, V.
116. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (2000) (declaring that illegally obtained wiretap
evidence cannot be introduced to the grand jury).
117. One example of a common law privilege is that between attorneys and clients. See,
e.g., Maine v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, 298 F.3d 60, 71 (1st Cir. 2002).
118. See Thirty-Second Annual Review of Criminal Procedure II. Preliminary
Proceedings, Grand Jury, 91 GEO. L.J. 210, 220-21 (citing Perlman v. United States, 247
U.S. 7, 12-13 (1918)).
119. See 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (2006) (stating requirements for issue of an NSL).

WEINER_CHRISTENSEN

2006]

2/3/2011 10:21 PM

“SPECIAL” DELIVERY

117

To effectively evaluate NSLs in the context of domestic criminal
investigations, several things must first be established. First, does issuing
an NSL constitute a search? If not, the use of NSLs need only be
reasonable to satisfy the Fourth Amendment. 120 The FBI asserts that NSLs
are not “searches” because they are only requests for information and
recipients are not compelled to comply as NSLs are not backed with the
contempt authority of the court. 121 While technically speaking the FBI’s
view is true, the average NSL recipient may nonetheless believe that a
“search” is taking place.
Second, NSLs are issued without a warrant or any type of judicial order,
such as a FISA order; they are issued upon the certification from the FBI
that the information requested is “relevant to an international terrorism or
espionage investigation.” 122 Therefore, they must fit within an exception to
the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement if they are to fit within the
domestic criminal regulatory regime. As a comparison, administrative
subpoenas are “at best, constructive searches,” and as such they need not be
supported by probable cause and need only be “reasonable.”123 But there
are significant procedural differences between administrative subpoenas
and NSLs, most importantly differences in judicial review, which may
result in administrative subpoenas being reasonable while NSLs are not.124
The next sections will examine the “special-needs” exception and a more
general, totality of the circumstances reasonableness test.
A. Special-Needs Exception and NSLs
NSLs, aside from being issued without judicial review, are issued
without a showing that the target of the search is a terrorist or a terrorist
supporter—the FBI merely “certifies” that the information requested is
relevant to a counter-terrorism investigation. 125 While ordinarily a search
must be based on an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing, when the risk
to the public safety is substantial and real, a suspicionless search may still
be “reasonable” and not violate the Fourth Amendment, even if one of the
120. Cf. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 486 F.2d 85, 92 (3d Cir. 1973) (holding grand jury
subpoena to not be a “search”).
121. Op-Ed., Rachel Brand & John Pistole, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, The Use and
Purpose
of
National
Security
Letters,
available
at
http://www.fbi.gov/page2/natsecurityletters.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2006) [hereinafter
FBI Use and Purpose Memo].
122. Id.
123. See Okla. Press Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946); see also United
States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 651-52 (1950).
124. Cf. United States v. Bailey, 228 F.3d 341, 348 (4th Cir. 2000).
125. 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (2006).
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goals is criminal prosecution. 126 The Supreme Court has long held that
“the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of
[individualized] suspicion” 127 and “in certain limited circumstances, the
Government’s need . . . is sufficiently compelling to justify the intrusion on
privacy entailed by conducting such searches without any measure of
individualized suspicion.” 128 Accordingly, an NSL unsupported by
individualized suspicion may be consistent with the Fourth Amendment if
it fits within the confines of the special-needs doctrine.
The doctrine of special needs addresses situations where circumstances
beyond an ordinary need for law enforcement make the warrant/probable
cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment impracticable.129 The
special-needs exception seems especially applicable in an analysis of NSLs
because they too blur the line between law enforcement and another
legitimate governmental purpose—national security.
To apply the exception, the court first determines if a special need exists,
and then determines whether the state’s interest in that special need
outweighs the privacy interest of the individual searched.130 Some
examples of circumstances where a special-needs exception was applied
include the search of probationers’ homes when probation officers have
“reasonable grounds” to believe that contraband is present,131 as well as the
drug testing of high school athletes, 132 DEA employees in sensitive
positions, 133 and locomotive engineers involved in a railway accident.134
Two recent Supreme Court cases, however, demonstrate that warrantless
searches will fall outside the special-needs exception to the Fourth
Amendment when they serve the primary purpose of general crime
126. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 305-06 (1997).
127. Bd. of Educ. of Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Co. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822,
829 (2002) (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976)).
128. Id. (citing Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668
(1989)); see also Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
129. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
130. Id. at 873-76.
131. Id. at 870-71.
132. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995) (permitting drug
testing of high school student athletes to protect their health).
133. See Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 667 (1989)
(upholding mandatory drug testing for DEA agents employed in specific sensitive
positions).
134. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 633 (1989) (permitting
mandatory drug testing of locomotive engineers following a railway accident). But see
Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 322 (1997) (finding that purported special need for drug
testing candidates for public office in Georgia did not fall into category of permissible
suspicionless searches, in light of the candidates’ privacy interests).
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control. 135 In Indianapolis v. Edmond, the Court invalidated a highway
checkpoint program on the grounds that the primary purpose was general
crime control, despite the secondary purposes of driver safety and disaster
prevention. 136 The following year, in Ferguson v. Charleston, the Court
further held that a government program with the primary purpose of crime
control did not outweigh the privacy interests of pregnant mothers unless
the drug testing was done with their consent. 137
The most recent Supreme Court case to address the question of special
needs, Illinois v. Lidster, expanded the scope of permissible warrantless
searches by allowing them where the primary purpose of the law is
“information-seeking.” 138 The Court recognized that despite the holding in
Edmond, there are instances in which a purpose other than the need for law
enforcement can relate to law enforcement activity, yet still justify a search
without individualized suspicion. 139
For NSLs to fulfill the requirements of the special-needs exception, they
would have to serve a primary purpose other than the need for ordinary law
enforcement. Evidence of a special purpose may be found in the ECPA
itself; the ECPA includes a provision allowing law enforcement to obtain
electronic records in domestic criminal investigations.140 Therefore,
because NSLs address access to the same records as section 2703, but for a
different purpose, it seems that they serve a purpose outside of ordinary law
enforcement.
Regardless of whether or not NSLs have a primary purpose beyond the
need for ordinary law enforcement, they are reasonable under the totality of
the circumstances.
Notwithstanding the special-needs exception,
warrantless searches can still be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
The Court has held that special-needs cases are actually “limited
exception[s]” to the traditional Fourth Amendment totality of the
circumstances reasonableness analysis. 141 Further, “there is no basis for
examining official purpose” under the totality of the circumstances test, as

135. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 81 (2001) (holding that drug
testing of obstetrics patients for the purpose of crime control was unreasonable);
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2000) (holding highway checkpoints for the
purpose of drug interdiction do not serve a special need).
136. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 43, 47-48.
137. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 85-86.
138. 540 U.S. 419, 424 (2004).
139. Id.
140. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2006) (allowing a government entity to require an electronic
service provider to turn over stored electronic records if the government obtains a warrant
from a criminal court).
141. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 (2001).
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would be required by the special needs test.142 Even if the primary purpose
of the search is general law enforcement, the warrantless search is still
permissible under the totality of the circumstances so long as the
government’s legitimate interests outweigh the privacy interest of the
individual. 143
Totality of the Circumstances
To analyze NSLs under a general reasonableness balancing test, it would
certainly be helpful to have access to information regarding the use and
effectiveness of NSLs in counter-terrorism operations. Michael J. Woods,
former chief of the FBI’s National Security Law Unit, makes the argument
that the types of transactional records that can be gathered using NSLs are
an “extraordinarily valuable source of data for counterintelligence analysts”
because it is far more difficult for terrorists to cover up their “transactional
footsteps” than it is for them to cover the substance of their
communications. 144 Furthermore, it has been argued that NSLs help
expedite the process of following up on terrorist threats and tips in a timely
manner. 145 Judge Victor Marrero of the Southern District of New York,
despite opposing unchecked NSL power, nonetheless agrees that efficiency
in national security investigations is valuable. 146 National security is
clearly “a paramount value, unquestionably one of the highest purposes for
which any sovereign government is ordained.” 147
On the other side of the balancing test, one must consider the
individual’s privacy interests. As explored earlier in the discussion of the
third party doctrine, 148 there is arguably a diminished privacy interest in
information voluntarily turned over to a third party. 149 If the risk of abuse
of NSL power is great enough, however, it can potentially shift the balance
towards finding NSLs unreasonable under a totality of the circumstances
balancing test.

142. Id. (upholding a warrantless search of a probationer’s apartment because the
government’s reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing outweighed a probationer’s diminished
expectation of privacy).
143. Id. at 119.
144. Woods, supra note 6, at 41-42.
145. FBI Use and Purpose Memo, supra note 121.
146. Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“To perform its
national security functions properly, government must be empowered to respond promptly
and effectively to public exigencies as they arise . . . .”).
147. Id.
148. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
149. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440-43 (1976).
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1. Potential for Abuse
Several factors may increase the potential for abuse of NSLs. These are:
(1) their secretive nature; 150 (2) the lack of oversight; 151 and (3) the fact
that important decisions are placed in the hands of low-level officers. 152
Arguably, the most compelling factor indicating a potential for abuse of
NSL power is the blurring of the line between foreign intelligence
investigations and ordinary domestic criminal investigations.
The Framers of the Constitution relied upon separation of powers and a
system of checks and balances to protect individual citizens from potential
abuse of civil liberties.153 There is a long history of such abuse in the
realm of domestic intelligence investigations. 154 For example, the FBI,
CIA, Army, and other agencies have carried out investigations that far
exceeded their intended scope. 155 Perhaps the most famous example is the
FBI’s domestic counter-intelligence program (“COINTELPRO”), which
was “designed to ‘disrupt’ groups and ‘neutralize’ individuals deemed
threats to national security.” 156 Under COINTELPRO, the government
targeted political opponents in order to discredit them in the eyes of the
public, 157 used the IRS to initiate tax investigations against political
opponents, 158 targeted “speakers, teachers, writers, and publications” in

150. The First Amendment impact of secrecy is outside the scope of this Note.
151. See infra notes 173-78 and accompanying text.
152. See Krent, supra note 47, at 95. Generally, the changes to NSLs under the
PATRIOT Act do exactly what Framer James Otis warned of—they place too much power
and discretion in the hands of low-level law enforcement officers. Otis argued that lowlevel officers were more likely to abuse their power either due to a lack of judgment or for
personal motivations. Id.
153. Id. at 94 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 333 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed.,
2005) (having two separate houses of Congress “doubles the security to the people by
requiring the concurrence of two distinct bodies in schemes of usurpation or perfidy”); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 73, at 392 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005) (stating that the
requirement that the President approve new laws provides “an additional security against the
enaction of improper laws”)).
154. See Swire, supra note 78, at 1316; see also SELECT COMM. TO STUDY
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, 94TH CONG.,
FINAL REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, Book II, § I
REPORT
IIA],
available
at
(1976)
[hereinafter
CHURCH
http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/cointelpro/churchfinalreportIIa.htm.
155. CHURCH REPORT IIA, supra note 154 , § 1 (“The tendency of intelligence activities to
expand beyond their initial scope is a theme which runs through every aspect of our
investigative findings. Intelligence collection programs naturally generate ever-increasing
demands for new data.”).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. MARTIN HALPERIN ET AL., THE LAWLESS STATE: CRIMES OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE
AGENCIES 191-94 (1976).
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attempt to chill political opponents’ First Amendment speech rights,159 and
generally infringed the “values of privacy and freedom which our
Constitution seeks to protect.” 160
With NSLs, the potential for abuse also arises from the fact that the
information obtained under foreign intelligence standards can be misused.
If an investigation simply has as a “significant purpose” the gathering of
intelligence on a suspected terrorist or terrorist supporter, what safeguards
are in place to stop the investigators from turning over all of the
information to a criminal prosecutor? Moreover, what would prevent a
prosecutor or, perhaps, an individual in the administration with a political
motivation, from suggesting to a Special Agent in Charge of a field office
that he should certify that a particular person is being targeted as part of an
“authorized investigation” and use an NSL to obtain Internet or telephone
records for that individual? The potential for abuse of NSLs is certainly
great, but the answer to the question of “reasonableness balancing” may
turn on one’s view of which is more important: civil liberties or national
security. As more information about actual abuse of NSL power becomes
public, however, perhaps the balance will shift towards stricter protections
for privacy. 161
PART III. HOW TO DELIVER A SAFER NSL
The previous section left open the question of whether NSLs could fit
within an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. It
does seem there are a sufficient number of arguments for fitting NSLs
within a domestic regulatory scheme, if necessary, including: (1) NSLs are
not “searches” and therefore need not satisfy the Fourth Amendment
probable cause standard; (2) NSLs are foreign intelligence tools and
accordingly do not require warrants unless they go beyond the standards set
forth in 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1); (3) NSLs have a purpose beyond ordinary
law enforcement and therefore satisfy the special-needs exception; or (4)
NSLs are reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. Regardless of
how one classifies NSLs, there are steps that can be taken to safeguard civil
liberties, while allowing the FBI to retain the power to issue NSLs. There
are several potential avenues for oversight of NSLs including intra-agency
regulations, ex ante judicial monitoring, ex post judicial review, legislative
oversight, and public advocacy.
159. CHURCH REPORT IIA, supra note 154, § 1.
160. Id.
161. But cf. David Kirkpatrick & Scott Shane, G.O.P. Senators Say Accord is Set on
TIMES,
Mar.
8,
2006,
at
A1.
Wiretapping,
N.Y.
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A. Administrative Checks
One possible defense against abuse is the internal check on surveillance
powers from within the law enforcement agency. 162 First, the FBI Office
of General Counsel issued a memo advising agents how to use NSLs
correctly. 163 This memo suggests that NSLs should be used “judiciously”
because they are “powerful investigative tools.”164 Furthermore, the memo
advises field offices to “establish[] and enforce[] an appropriate review and
approval process for the use of NSL authorities.” 165
In addition, each law enforcement and intelligence agency has an
internal review board to investigate impropriety within the agency.166
Those internal review boards may provide a safeguard against abuse,
because they work in the same agency as the investigators and would have
the easiest access to the entire record without allowing classified
information from leaving the office. But is it wise to entrust the policing of
investigations to the very same agencies that carry them out? For instance,
it is unknown whether internal oversight officers are given sufficient
resources or have sufficient motivation to effectively monitor the
investigators. 167 While the agencies may be equipped to provide a first line
of defense against abuse, perhaps oversight is better left to external
“watchdogs.” 168 Internal monitoring can also be problematic when the
agency both defines the meanings of the terminology in the applicable
statutes and then enforces the laws according to their own interpretations.
For example, while the FBI Office of General Counsel’s memo on NSLs
explains that they may be issued “during the course of a full international
terrorism or foreign counterterrorism investigation,” but “cannot be used in
criminal investigations unrelated to international terrorism or clandestine
intelligence activities,” it allows for NSLs to be issued in preliminary
investigations where the nexus to counterterrorism has not yet been
established. 169 If an investigation is authorized under FCIG its purpose is

162. Seth Kreimer, Watching the Watchers: Surveillance, Transparency, and Political
Freedom in the War on Terror, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 133, 178 (2004).
163. See generally FBI NSL Memo, supra note 22.
164. Id. at 3.
165. Id.
166. Kreimer, supra note 162, at 178; see also Eric Lichtblau, Justice Department
Investigators Find a Cover-Up in an F.B.I. Terror Case in Florida, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4,
2005, at 37.
167. Kreimer, supra note 162, at 178.
168. Id.
169. FBI NSL Memo, supra note 22, at 2-3. To issue an NSL for a preliminary
investigation, the investigation must be authorized by the Attorney General’s Guidelines for
FBI Foreign Intelligence Collection and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations
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presumptively to “protect against international terrorism or clandestine
activities.” 170 It is troubling that the very agency that is supposed to be
limited by the “related to a foreign intelligence investigation” requirement
is also charged with determining which investigations fall into that
category. Additionally, the fact that preliminary investigations are
permitted to fall into this category means that practically any investigation,
at least at the initial stage, may allegedly be connected to foreign
intelligence and thus, allow access to almost any records that law
enforcement wants to examine.
B. Judicial Oversight
Judicial oversight can be divided into two categories: ex ante judicial
monitoring and ex post judicial review. 171 As previously established,
judicial approval is not required to issue an NSL. 172 One obvious way to
address the Fourth Amendment concerns regarding the reasonableness of
NSLs would be to require prior judicial approval. NSLs could be subject to
a standard similar to that used to obtain Title III wiretaps. 173 Some would
surely argue that this requirement would be overly burdensome on both
investigators and judicial resources. Nevertheless, judicial approval has
been required in many types of domestic investigations and has not proven
unduly burdensome. Alternatively, because NSLs are tools for foreign
intelligence, they can be placed under the auspices of FISA and be subject
to approval from the FISC before an NSL can be issued. This would
ensure that sensitive information relating to terrorism investigations would
be handled carefully and cautiously. The FISC can also ensure expedited
processing that an ordinary court may not be able to provide.174
Furthermore, the long term and ongoing nature of a terrorism investigation
makes it difficult to present specific facts to a judge to show probable
cause; placing NSLs under the jurisdiction of the FISA court would both
(“FCIG”). Id.
170. Id.
171. Ex ante judicial oversight derives from a statutory requirement of court approval,
such as a typical domestic criminal search warrant. See LA FAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE,
supra note 42, at § 4.1. Ex post judicial oversight refers to the eventual contestability of
suspect searches or the fruits thereof by the parties searched. See id.
172. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
173. See Title III of the Omnibus Crime and Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18
U.S.C. § 2511 (2002).
174. The FISC has eleven judges who specialize in national security matters. 50 U.S.C. §
1803(a) (2006). They work around the clock to process FISA requests. Additionally, the
FISC has a seventy-two-hour delay provision to allow emergency orders to be reviewed
within seventy-two hours without requiring law enforcement to wait for the FISC to
convene. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(4).
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maintain the government’s ability to get NSLs authorized where needed,
while providing an extra check on unfettered executive branch power.
Ex post judicial review is another option to help safeguard privacy
interests while still allowing the FBI to use NSLs for national security
purposes. NSLs could be redrafted to specifically inform their recipients of
their right to go to court to challenge the reasonableness of the NSL. Part
of the government’s justification for the constitutionality of NSLs is that
they are not searches, but merely information requests. As a practical
matter, however, very few recipients would feel such a request is
“voluntary” when the FBI shows up with an NSL, asks the recipient to
bring the requested records to the FBI’s office, and states that the recipient
cannot tell anyone about the NSL. Explicitly stating that NSLs are not
court-ordered could eliminate concerns that NSLs are compulsory searches
and as such must be approved by a court in order to be constitutional.
Another option is to have ex post judicial monitoring structured in a
manner comparable to the monitoring required for a Title III order. 175 This
may in fact be less burdensome than Title III because investigators will not
need prior approval and will follow a monitoring procedure that they are
quite familiar with in the domestic criminal realm.

C. Legislative Oversight
Generally, when members of the public are concerned about a law, the
official “answer” is that they should contact their congressman. With
regard to NSLs, the DOJ has asserted that Congress is actively involved in
monitoring their use, and that the public should be assured that their elected
representatives are looking out for their privacy interests. 176 This
reasoning fails to take into account several key points. First, in a
representative democracy, elected officials are heavily influenced by public
opinion. It is hard to rely on Congress to protect our privacy rights if
members of the public are unaware that NSLs are being issued and
therefore are not actively involved in seeking congressional intervention on
their behalf. Second, the DOJ explanation ignores the partisan politics
prevalent in the congressional oversight process. For example, the chair of
the Judiciary or the Intelligence committees in either house of Congress
175. Title III wiretaps require reporting to the magistrate who authorized them. See 18
U.S.C. §§ 2518-19. Not only does Title III require prior judicial approval, it includes
procedures to safeguard the rights of the individuals whose communications are intercepted.
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22.
176. See generally U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Questions About the USA PATRIOT Act,
http://www.lifeandliberty.gov (last visited Sept. 26, 2006).
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could issue a Congressional subpoena to compel more complete disclosure
from the FBI on the use of NSLs. Of course, “the minority has no power to
compel, and . . . Republicans are not going to push for oversight of the
Republicans.” 177
Effective legislative oversight requires both the cooperation of the DOJ,
with regard to accurate reporting of the use of NSLs, as well as the ability
of recipients to inform their representative that an NSL was issued.
Congressional oversight, while potentially valuable, is too dependent on
information obtained from the DOJ for its effectiveness.178 Those who
support the continued use of NSLs do not want to doubt the accuracy of the
DOJ’s numbers, but self-reported numbers may have a greater potential for
misrepresentation without external verification. The gag order provision of
section 2709(c) would prevent a constituent from disclosing the issuance of
an NSL; without the efforts of external groups, possible governmental
abuses of NSL power may not be brought to the public’s attention.
D. Non-governmental Advocacy Groups
While it is possible for the legislature and the courts to provide checks
on executive power and still maintain the secrecy of investigations,179
perhaps the most effective oversight comes from non-governmental civil
liberties groups, such as the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) and
the Electronic Privacy Information Center (“EPIC”). These groups can
initiate lawsuits to obtain records and documents to track the use of
NSLs. 180 In 2004, internal FBI reviews identified 113 violations of federal
law or bureau policy—again, presumably involving the use of NSLs—most
of which related to intelligence or national security investigations.181
While “watchdog” groups are important sources of information for the
public, 182 there is a tendency to exaggerate the threat that NSLs actually
present. Such slanted presentation may result in public resentment and
may ultimately undermine the valuable service that such groups provide.183

177. Gellman, supra note 1, at A1 (quoting Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-Cal.), a House Judiciary
Committee member).
178. See Dahlia Lithwick & Julia Turner, A Guide To the PATRIOT Act, Part 1: Should
Sept.
8,
2003,
You
Be
Scared
of
the
PATRIOT
Act?,
SLATE,
http://www.slate.com/id/2087984/ (describing how FOIA requests have been incomplete
and Congressional requests have been ignored or classified).
179. Kreimer, supra note 162, at 178.
180. Id.
181. See Eric Lichtblau, Tighter Oversight of F.B.I. Is Urged After Investigation Lapses,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2005, at A16.
182. FOIA requests have allowed public access to DOJ documents.
183. See Eric Lichtblau, Ashcroft Mocks Librarians and Others Who Oppose Parts of
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IV. CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding concerns over the lack of safeguards and intrusions into
privacy, NSLs have existed for nearly twenty years and are likely to
continue to be used. Effective oversight is essential to making NSLs an
acceptable tool for law enforcement. While the Department of Justice has
not given specific information on how NSLs are used and whether or not
they have proved to be useful, there is great value in giving law
enforcement and intelligence agencies the tools they need to do their jobs
to keep our country safe. 184 But as Benjamin Franklin observed over 200
years ago, “they that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little
temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.” 185 The Framers of our
Constitution were wary of the potential for abuse in giving the executive
the power to search a man’s home or seize his property without requiring
the specification of the reason for the search and what the search was
expected to uncover to a neutral party. 186 Furthermore, they believed that
power in the hands of one branch of government, without meaningful and
thorough oversight by the other branches, would lead to overreaching and
infringement upon individual civil liberties. 187 Following 9/11, however,
the political climate in the United States, perhaps understandably, became
less protective of civil liberties and more interested in safeguarding our
borders and our cities. 188 In fact, a recent poll suggests that this attitude
continues five years later and that Americans have expressed a willingness
to tolerate invasions of privacy without warrants in order to fight terrorism,
despite being wary of the impact these types of actions might have on civil
liberties. 189 Unfortunately, in light of recent revelations about the
executive branch’s use of illegal—or at the very least, questionably legal—
wiretaps to spy on U.S. citizens, 190 the changes made to many existing laws
under the PATRIOT Act may continue to take this country further away
from the vigorous protections intended by the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights.
Counterterrorism Law, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2003, at A23.
184. See generally Doe v. United States, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
185. See JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 348 (Emily Morrison Beck ed., 1980).
186. U.S. CONST. amend IV.
187. Krent, supra note 47, at 94-95.
188. Doe, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 471.
189. Adam Nagourney & Janet Elder, New Poll Finds Mixed Support for Wiretaps, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2006, at A1.
190. See Transcript, U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee Holds a Hearing on Wartime
Executive Power and the NSA’s Surveillance Authority, WASH. POST., Feb. 6, 2006 (online
edition),
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/02/06/AR2006020600931.html.

